By Nicholas Thompson

Earlier this month, the Nuclear Engineering Student Delegation (NESD) met in the U.S. Capitol to advocate for nuclear science and engineering. The NESD is a student run and selected organization that brings nuclear engineering students to Washington, D.C. to meet with policymakers and others who influence policy. Typically, the NESD focuses on advocating for nuclear engineering education and research funding. This year, the NESD also advocated for an interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank, and funding for Small Modular Reactors.

The week starts out with all the Delegates writing a Policy Statement, which is distributed in the meetings throughout the week. Each year, the delegation includes students from all parts of nuclear science and engineering. This year, Delegates have backgrounds including reactor engineering, radiation detection, nuclear security and nonproliferation, medical physics, and nuclear fuel cycle.

Some of the high profile meetings included Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy Dr. Peter Lyons at the Department of Energy and Commissioner William Magwood of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The NESD also met with the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which regulates radiation and is currently working on new regulations on carbon emissions from power plants. To cap the week off, the Delegates met with their Senators and Representatives and over 150 other Congressional offices.

If you are interested in learning more about the program you can visit the NESD website (www.nesd.org), email this year’s Chair, Nicholas Thompson, or next year’s Chair, Lane Carasik. Below is the list of this year’s Delegates, more information about their backgrounds can be found here. Applications open for next year’s Delegation in January.

Nicholas Thompson, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (Chair)
Lane Carasik, Texas A&M University (Co-Vice Chair)
Anagha Iyengar, University of Tennessee, Knoxville (Co-Vice Chair)
Daniel Curtis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Remy Devoe, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Matthew Ellis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tom Grimes, Purdue University (Returning Delegate)
Kyle Hartig, Penn State University
Jacob Jurewicz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Justin Knowles, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Taylor Lane, Texas A&M University
Jeremy Pearson, University of California, Irvine (Returning Delegate)
Miriam Rathbun, University of Pittsburgh
Ben Reinke, The Ohio State University (Returning Delegate)
Matthew Riblett, Virginia Commonwealth University
Tracey-Ann Wellington, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Samantha Winkle, University of Utah

By Lenka Kollar

The Focus on Communications Workshop held on June 19 at the 2014 American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting posed the question: “What will it take to move nuclear energy forward?” Mimi Limbach of the Potomac Communications Group covered some very interesting poll data and facilitated a conversation on how to move nuclear energy forward through effective communication.

Read more on the ANS Nuclear Cafe...

By Wes Deason

A panel of nuclear safety experts convened to discuss the how the safety of U.S. nuclear plants have been addressed following a detailed analysis of the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan. The panel focused mainly on changing regulations from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), new performance standards from several professional engineering societies, and improvements in technology related to mitigating the effects of a Fukushima-type accident – also known as a station blackout (SBO).

William Reckley, a member of the NRC’s Risk Management Task Force, explained that the new NRC regulations would require all plants to prepare mitigation strategies which would be implemented in the event of a SBO. These Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies (SBOMS) are evaluated using a three phase approach, with an end goal for maintaining core cooling and containment and spent fuel pool cooling for an indefinite amount of time. The three phases, which occur in increasing time periods after reactor shutdown are:

• An Initial phase which must be survived with installed equipment.
• A Transition phase which must by survived with portable, onsite equipment.
• A Final phase which must be survived with resources obtained from offsite.

The panel, which convened at the 2014 American Nuclear Society (ANS) Annual Meeting, also featured representatives from the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). The professional society representatives discussed several standards, which would supplement regulations developed by the NRC. Concerns were expressed over the consideration of “beyond design basis accidents” (accidents of either type or magnitude considered to be out of the realm of possibility for a nuclear plant) in the present standards.

The technological improvements presented at the panel, which help mitigate issues observed at the Fukushima Daiichi accident, were related to the over-pressure and over-temperature of the core containment and subsequent leakage of gasses. One of the places of concern for containment are the penetrations which allow electronics cables to carry information over the containment boundary. The development of “glass-to-metal seals” greatly increase the pressure and temperatures that can be handled by these containment penetration points. Additionally, the development of better hydrogen detectors aid in the mitigation of hydrogen buildup external to containment and the prevention of an associated hydrogen explosion.

By Nicholas Thompson

One of the most controversial issues with nuclear energy is nuclear waste. In particular, disposing of plutonium in such a way that it doesn't lead to proliferation. The “Plutonium Disposition Alternatives” Panel at the American Nuclear Society 2014 Annual Meeting in Reno, NV set out to shed some light on the issue and possible solutions.

The United States and Russia made an agreement to get rid of 17,000 nuclear weapons worth of plutonium back in 2000 (Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement or PMDA). There are a number of ways to dispose of plutonium, falling into two general categories:

• consuming the plutonium in either reactors or accelerators
  
• immobilizing it in a waste form and putting it into permanent storage 
  

On the reactor side, a number of reactors can be used; existing light water reactors with Plutonium/Uranium Oxide fuel (Mixed Oxide or MOX), high temperature gas reactors, and fast reactors are some examples. It should be noted that plutonium generated U.S. light water reactors is not high enough purity to be used in a weapon, this program is only for getting rid of weapons plutonium. On the direct disposal side, plutonium can be vitrified (put into glass) and stored in a deep geological repository.

While some of these technologies are closer to implementation than others, all of them are technically viable. Because there are so many options, making the choice between which path to take ends up being influenced more by sociopolitical issues than by technical issues.

In the earlier 2000’s, the United States made the decision to use MOX fuel in our current generation reactors to dispose of this weapons Plutonium. The MOX facility is being built, but it is over budget and not currently in the President's budget. Russia decided to go with a fast reactor, which is currently consuming their weapons plutonium. For the U.S. to fulfill it’s commitments in the PMDA, the MOX facility will need to be built or another path will need to be investigated and taken.

It’s important for the US to be able to deliver on reduction agreements in order to be taken seriously at future nonproliferation and nuclear security negotiations. Cutting funding to the MOX project now, even if it’s only for a year, would cause even bigger delays in its construction, and also delay the actual start of US Plutonium disposition. Cutting funding completely and moving to another disposition path would likely take another decade.

What disposition path should the United States have taken? 
What should the federal government do now?