By Lenka Kollar

A summary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, US, and EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) is shown in the image below. 

The technical measures in the JCPOA limit Iran's nuclear program to peaceful uses, as allowed by the Nonproliferation Treaty, and enhance transparency with oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Sanctions are lifted simultaneously with further actions in 8 years, including the possible opening of commercial nuclear trade between the US and Iran. 

This is a plan of action based on a set of measures overseen by an international agency (the IAEA). It is not based on trust, like a treaty would be. It does, however, provide steps in the right direction to form a better relationship between Iran and the US, EU, and the UN Security Council. The politics are complicated, and won't be easily resolved by an agreement. However, this plan of action is feasible because both sides agreed to it and it contains tangible technical measures than can be implemented and monitored. 

By Lenka Kollar

Remember the interim deal reached with Iran a few months ago? According to President Obama's speech (above) last week, it's been successful and the United States, along with the rest of the P5, have negotiated a framework for a permanent agreement that will lift sanctions on Iran while deterring their nuclear program.

The key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program include:

• Reduction in uranium enrichment capability
• Increased transparency and inspections
• Suspension of reprocessing research (for plutonium)
• Lifting of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran

As I always say, according to the Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran has the right to peaceful nuclear energy, but it needs to assure the absence of a nuclear weapons program through transparency. Iran has faltered on its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and therefore, that justifies sanctions by the UN Security Council. 

The details of this framework take into account all parties interests and it is a good deal, overall. The international community can ensure the lack of nuclear weapons development in Iran while Iran keeps its peaceful nuclear technology, used for nuclear energy and research and development. Premier scientific programs and advanced electricity generation are important and a source of pride for Iran.

While this framework meets stakeholder interests and legitimizes those options, the negotiation was conducted using power from the side of the U.S. and the rest of the P5. As President Obama says, it is not based on trust. Because of this, I am concerned for the sustainability of the deal. 

Successful negotiations are built on good relationships and open lines of communication. The transparency portion of this deal will be the most important as it will build mutual trust and thus make the relationship between Iran, the IAEA, and international community stronger. A deal based on trust will be more sustainable and even eliminate the need for a "deal."

As a nuclear nonproliferation expert, I think this is a good framework, and my Iranian classmate agrees. I urge the U.S. Congress and other policymakers to support it.

By Lenka Kollar

In my International Political Analysis class at INSEAD this week, we analyzed the shifting of power in the world, specifically the rise of China and India. This being a business school, the focus of the conversation was on economic sources of power. While a strong economy and large GDP are important for maintaining power in this globalized world, political power is not necessarily determined by economic factors.

Towards the end of our class discussion, I finally brought up the issue of nuclear weapons. I think that my generation often forgets the political power provided by nuclear weapons because we did not live through the Cold War. However, we do live in a time where the world order is determined by nuclear arms. The P5 of the UN Security Council are the five official nuclear weapons states (United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) recognized by the Nonproliferation Treaty, to which almost every single country is a signatory. Other than that, only three other countries have nuclear weapons and there is significant international effort spent to prevent more countries from having nuclear arms.

Therefore, despite the evolving economic powers, I don't see political power changing unless nuclear weapons become obsolete or the P5 do actually disarm. However, there is a chance of more countries joining the "nuclear club" and perhaps diluting the power of the P5.

For a deeper discussion, read Nuclear Weapons as the Currency of Power.

By Wes Deason

Current and former executives from the nuclear security industry shared insights on the evolving role of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in the nonproliferation and global security community. The NNSS, once home to the Nevada Test Site where hundreds of above and below ground nuclear weapons tests were once conducted, now carries a much different role.

Focus by the NNSS has pivoted to assisting in the enforcement of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. However, some sub-critical weapons tests, physics tests where no self-sustaining fission chain reaction is created, continue to be held in accordance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. These evolving changes were discussed at the 2014 American Nuclear Society (ANS) Annual Meeting in Reno, Nevada.

Dr. Raymond Juzaitis, President of National Security Technologies LLC, emphasized the increasingly complex nuclear security environment exposed by the rising popularity of nuclear power production worldwide. To adapt to this complex environment, the NNSS currently conducts research and development activities in the fields of nuclear materials security, nuclear materials detection, pre-detonation nuclear forensics, nuclear treaty monitoring and verification, and post-detonation nuclear forensics.

The discussion also focused on the interactions with the state of Nevada which include environmental monitoring and restoration work. Additionally, collaborations currently are being pursued with the University of Nevada at Las Vegas and Reno.

By Lenka Kollar

University of Tennessee nuclear engineering graduate student Alicia Swift had a chance to jump into international nuclear issues from the beginning of her career. As a part of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), she spent a year at the NNSA headquarters forming crucial components to their current research and future careers at the DOE national laboratories. 

At the 2014 American Nuclear Society (ANS) Annual Meeting, Swift elaborated on shared the global impact of her work while at the NNSA. In particular, Swift worked on the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), where she was responsible for the physical protection of nuclear materials in Central America. Her team conducted training on radiological safety and security and installed physical protection measures in places like Mexico City and Barbados. Swift now conducts her graduate research as Los Alamos National Laboratory in neutron imaging. 

The NNSA Graduate Fellowship provides graduate students and recent graduates an opportunity to work on national security projects sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The fellowship is a one-year program catered to students interested in nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The fellowship attracts students from technical backgrounds and policy backgrounds and can be a unique learning experience for both.

The Head of the Department of Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Tero Varjoranta, is interviewed in this video and provides a great overview of the international safeguards process. His department ensures that countries are not making nuclear weapons out of out of peaceful nuclear technology, such as research and commercial nuclear power plants. 

By Lenka Kollar

The Nuclear Security Summit is ongoing this week at The Hague in Netherlands and one of the biggest successes is that Japan has agreed to allow the United States to take over a stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear material in Japan. This material is at the Fast Critical Assembly at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency and was used/produced in research for fast reactor development, not for nuclear weapons. However, the material is weapons-grade and thus its security is a concern.

President Obama's goal has been to secure nuclear material around the globe, mainly to protect from theft by non-state actors (e.g. terrorists). However, the Administration's recent decision to cut funding for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (read post) does not show commitment to nonproliferation goals. 

This agreement with Japan says that the United States will remove and dispose of the nuclear material. Having a MOX facility to put weapons-grade plutonium into commercial fuel and burn it in a reactor is the best way to dispose of it because it becomes too radioactive to use in a weapons. What is the point of taking control of the nuclear material in Japan if we can't dispose of it?

By Lenka Kollar

The nuclear deal with Iran negotiated last November goes into effect this week. Iran has stopped enriching uranium above 5% U-235 at the Natanz and Fordo facilities and has begun downblending its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium. This is all in exchange for relief from some US and EU sanctions that could amount to about $7 billion in petrochemical exports. However, most of the sanctions that began in 2006 will remain in force. (Read more on BBC News.)

Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have are also gaining access to the Iranian enrichment facilities this week to perform inspections to ensure that Iran is not enriching uranium above normal (commercial) amounts. These inspections are required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty to which Iran is a signatory. Iran has a history of not giving inspectors full access and thus raising suspicious about their nuclear activities. (Read more on NPR.)

The enrichment program of Iran has been suspicious because even though they claim it is for uranium production for their commercial nuclear energy plant, they have enriched uranium above needed commercial levels and also not allowed the IAEA full access (as required by the treaty). Under the same treaty, Iran absolutely has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful nuclear energy production. However, they must remain transparent in their program.

In my personal opinion, I think that in their initial motivation, Iran did want to enrich uranium for both ensured nuclear fuel supply and the ability to break out into developing nuclear weapons if tensions in the region worsened. Now, I think that Iran is suffering under the sanctions and wants to adhere to the treaty but is not willing to give up it's enrichment program. What do you think?

By Lenka Kollar

The "Middle East Flashpoints" event, organized by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, involved ample discussion about the current state of the region. The seminar was centered around the Israeli-Palestenian conflict but included some talk about the "nuclear situation" in Iran. Speakers included Shai Feldman, director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, and the moderator, Rachel Bronson of The Chicago Council.

The most interesting point made by the speakers was that the conflict concerning Iran's nuclear program could actually unite some other states in the Middle East because they have a common issue to deal with. Although Israel and Saudi Arabia are not necessarily on the same side of the Iran issue, they could work together to develop a solution. In addition, critics of the new nuclear agreement with Iran say that even though it changes the direction of the nuclear program, the leverage of sanctions is lost.

The chart below was provided at the seminar and is taken from the 2012 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy. It seems that most Americans want the UN Security Council to pressure Iran to stop enriching uranium. The recent deal does have this provision but it is only for enriching up to weapons-grade uranium, not commercially-usable levels. Iran does have a right to enrich uranium for commercial nuclear energy use under the Nonproliferation Treaty. Most Americans probably don't know that.

The results from the poll also show that Americans want tighter sanctions imposed on Iran but are torn on authorizing a military strike. Since the new agreement eases economic sanctions, it would be interesting to see an update for this poll and learn how the public feels about the newest agreement. 

What are your answers to the poll above?

My Answers
1. Not pressure Iran to stop enriching uranium: somewhat support*
2. Continue diplomatic efforts to get Iran to stop enriching uranium: somewhat support*
3. Impose tighter economic sanctions on Iran: somewhat support
4. Authorize a military struck against Iran's nuclear energy facilities: strongly oppose

*I support the UN Security Council pressuring Iran to stop enriching weapons-grade (not commercial-grade) uranium

By Lenka Kollar

On September 7, 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to propose the first comprehensive updating of regulations concerning Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities (10 CFR Part 810) since 1986. After a comment and review period, DOE published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking on August 2, 2013. The first public meeting on the supplemental notice was held on August 5 and then a second public meeting on November 15. Since I was in Washington, DC, last week, I had the chance to attend the second public meeting.

The issues discussed in the Nuclear Undone blog post earlier this week on nonproliferation versus nuclear trade were the same issues discussed at the public meeting. How can the government promote nuclear trade while meeting nonproliferation goals and obligations? Government officials from DOE, State Dept., Dept. of Commerce, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission gave presentations and answered questions. Present at the meeting were representatives from different U.S. nuclear companies and non-government organizations, such as the American Nuclear Society. 

"Part 810" is a set of regulations that implements Section 57 b.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act 1954. In order for a U.S. entity to export nuclear or related technology, they must apply for a license through DOE. This process has been called "slow, opaque, and unpredictable." Industry officials claim that this it is one of the slowest and most involved export control processes in the world, and thus inhibits trade. Aside from the regulatory changes, DOE is planning to "fix the process and improve overall implementation," which includes developing an e-licensing system and creating a users guide. The goal is for the licensing process to take a maximum of 90 days.

These procedural improvements come in addition to the regulatory changes, including changes to the list of countries classified under Specific Authorization (SA) and General Authorization (GA). Licenses for exports going to specifically authorized countries require a more rigorous review than those going to generally authorized countries because of elevated proliferation risk. Usually countries that have a 123 Agreement with the United States are generally authorized. 

The proposed rulemaking includes a reclassification of 80 countries to specific authorization because they have no 123 Agreement and little or no nuclear trade with the United States. Three countries, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kazakhstan, will be reclassified for general authorization. An economic impact study (pictured above) of this proposed reclassification shows that the general to specific authorization (GA to SA) category of countries will have a very small fraction of future U.S. nuclear trade (0.67%), and thus no economic impact. However, the study also shows that 55% of U.S. nuclear trade will still be with countries that are speficially authorized and need a more rigorous license review. In particular, China, India, and Russia have 123 Agreements with the United States but require specific authorization under Part 810. The nuclear industry is concerned about this and wants to propose an "intermediate" category between specific and general authorization, allowing for robust trade with major nuclear partners. 

The general feel of the public meeting was that both the government and industry want to make the Part 810 export control license more transparent and robust. However, the industry's major concern is with how lengthy the process is , especially when a country is specifically authorized. You can read more about the Part 810 rulemaking and see slides and transcripts from the public meeting on the DOE/NNSA website. You can also learn more about the industry's concerns on the Nuclear Energy Institute website. 

The public comment period to the proposed Part 810 rulemaking is open until November 29, 2013. Click here for more information.