By Lenka Kollar
The commercial nuclear industry is unique in that it was essentially born out of weapons and military programs. The technology used to develop nuclear weapons was also found to be beneficial for energy production, and thus nuclear reactors to power submarines and then to produce commercial electricity were developed. Nuclear technology inherently has the risk of weapons proliferation and must be controlled. Most countries with nuclear industries, including the United States, have stringent export control laws that control the trade of nuclear (and related) technology. These laws control the international exports of things like nuclear reactor designs, nuclear fuel, and even accelerometers that could be used in a weapon missile. The nuclear industry often complains that the U.S. export control laws are too stringent, inhibiting trade. At the same time, those in the nonproliferation community often say that they are not strict enough, because of the historical cases in which countries have obtained nuclear technology and developed nuclear weapons.
It seems that nonproliferation and nuclear trade are often at odds with each other. Could both the nonproliferation regime and nuclear trade be strengthened if the "versus" was removed the the two sides worked together? A recent American Nuclear Society position statement makes the point that U.S. global nuclear leadership is strengthened through export-driven engagement. In other words, we have a better seat at the "nonproliferation table" if we are a leader in the nuclear energy industry. Right now, the United States is losing dominance of the global nuclear industry because of several reasons, one of which may be strict export control laws. In order for a country to do significant nuclear business with the United States, they must negotiate a so-called "123 Agreement."
The commercial nuclear industry is unique in that it was essentially born out of weapons and military programs. The technology used to develop nuclear weapons was also found to be beneficial for energy production, and thus nuclear reactors to power submarines and then to produce commercial electricity were developed. Nuclear technology inherently has the risk of weapons proliferation and must be controlled. Most countries with nuclear industries, including the United States, have stringent export control laws that control the trade of nuclear (and related) technology. These laws control the international exports of things like nuclear reactor designs, nuclear fuel, and even accelerometers that could be used in a weapon missile. The nuclear industry often complains that the U.S. export control laws are too stringent, inhibiting trade. At the same time, those in the nonproliferation community often say that they are not strict enough, because of the historical cases in which countries have obtained nuclear technology and developed nuclear weapons.
It seems that nonproliferation and nuclear trade are often at odds with each other. Could both the nonproliferation regime and nuclear trade be strengthened if the "versus" was removed the the two sides worked together? A recent American Nuclear Society position statement makes the point that U.S. global nuclear leadership is strengthened through export-driven engagement. In other words, we have a better seat at the "nonproliferation table" if we are a leader in the nuclear energy industry. Right now, the United States is losing dominance of the global nuclear industry because of several reasons, one of which may be strict export control laws. In order for a country to do significant nuclear business with the United States, they must negotiate a so-called "123 Agreement."
A new 123 Agreement was recently signed with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and included the provision that the UAE will not pursue enrichment and reprocessing (the nuclear technologies that are most closely related to weapons development). Some people in the U.S. government and Congress have coined this as the "gold standard" agreement and that we should impose this provision on all countries. However, it was UAE's choice to make it a law in their country to not pursue enrichment and reprocessing. Not all countries that want to do nuclear trade with the United States will forgo their right (according to the Nonproliferation Treaty) to have enrichment and reprocessing technology.
What is the right balance between nonproliferation and nuclear trade? Let's use Jordan as an example. Jordan is strongly interested in developing nuclear energy to meet it's electricity needs and become more independent from importing energy (read article). If Jordan signs a 123 Agreement with the United States, and a U.S. company sells them a nuclear reactor, then Jordan's nuclear industry is based on U.S. technology. This gives the United States more control in Jordan regarding nonproliferation and safety. On the other hand, if another country, such as Russia or China, sells Jordan a nuclear reactor, then that country has more control in Jordan and possibly that region. What if, in either case, there is an arms race in the Middle East and Jordan decides to go against their Nonproliferation Treaty obligations and develop nuclear weapons from the nuclear technology that was exported to them? (This is not an easy endeavor and would require different technology than a nuclear reactor, although the material from the reactor could theoretically be used for weapons.) In the case of proliferation, export control would have failed no matter which country the technology came from. The real question is, would Jordan be more likely to proliferate if the United States or another country owned the nuclear technology?
The reality is that Jordan has already selected a Russian company to supply its first nuclear power plant (read article) and the United States has still failed to negotiate a nuclear trade agreement with Jordan. Even though Jordan has been completely compliant with And Jordan is not the only example, other countries that are developing new nuclear industries are not buying from the United States.
In order to remain a leader in the global nuclear industry and stay influential in the nonproliferation regime, the United States needs to start exporting nuclear energy technology on a much larger scale, or at least equal the efforts of other nuclear suppliers, such as Russia.
How can we balance nonproliferation goals and nuclear industry exports?
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